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Abstract  
This article uses a general equilibrium framework and econometric analyses to examine 
economic wide impacts of the Conservation Reserves Program. It determines direct and indirect 
factors which affect the economic efficiency of the program and shows their magnitudes. It 
shows that the interaction between the program and the tax system causes indirect efficiency 
costs but the interaction between the program and the agricultural support subsidies generate 
economic gains. The program has the potential to distort the labor market and cause efficiency 
losses form this channel. However the analytical model shows that trade can reduce social costs 
of the policy because a part of the burden of the policy can be passed on to foreign consumers of 
crop products through the world market. The numerical results show that at the current level of 
acreage reduction (34 millions acres), the marginal cost of spending one more dollar on the 
program is about $1.9 for the US economy. In addition, the numerical results illustrate that the 
program has the potential to generate different and significant unintended economic impacts. For 
example, depending on the parameters of the model, the program can raise the prices of land up 
to 10.6%, generate up to 20% land conversion, and raise the demand for nitrogen fertilizer up to 
4.2% at the current level of acreage reduction. Finally, the empirical regression results 
demonstrate that the program has affected the production behavior of the crop industry 
significantly. In particular, the program has increased the demand for fertilizer and labor and has 
decreased the demand for land and capital.  
Keywords: land retirement, slippage effect, efficiency cost, agricultural pollution, tax system 
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 Introduction 
Acreage reduction programs have played a major role in the US agricultural policy in the past 73 
years, at least from the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938 (Ericksen 
and Collins, 1985). Prior to 1986, acreage reduction programs have been mainly used to control 
and reduce crop production based on the short term contracts. The Conservation Title of the 1985 
Food Security changed this pattern and allowed the government to retire environmentally 
sensitive croplands based on the long term contracts (10 to 15 years). The Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), which has been established under this act, has begun retiring cropland in 1986. 
This program has retired about 34 million acres of cropland shortly after its beginning and 
continued to set aside the same acres of cropland from production thereafter
1. 
Figure 1 shows the history of retired acres during 1955 to 2004. This figure shows that 
unlike other acreage reduction programs, which retired land with a high degree of dispersion 
over time, the CRP has persistently retired about 34 million acres of land during its presence. 
This program which extensively targets land use in agriculture over time has the potential to 
affect resource allocation in the whole economy and particularly in agriculture. This paper aims 
to estimate the overall efficiency costs of this program regardless of its environmental impacts 
and examine its long term economic impacts on the demand for the main agricultural inputs 
including labor, land, capital, and fertilizer.    
The economic efficiency of the acreage reduction programs and their economic and 
environmental consequences are important subjects that have been addressed frequently in the 
literature. The efficiency of alternative targeting instrument for selecting the land to be retired 
and the cost-effectiveness of retired acreages (in terms of forgone production and environmental 
gains) are two major issues that have been discussed extensively in the literature. Many papers 
                                                           
1 Retired acres under other acreage reduction programs (such as the Soil Bank Program and the Acreage Reduction 
Program) were returned to crop production during the period of 1986-1995. 
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 investigate determinants of the cost effectiveness of land retirement and provide estimates of 
their magnitudes. For example, three recent papers in this field are Feng el al. (2005); Kirwan, 
Lubowski, and Roberts (2005); and Yang, Khanna and Farnsworth (2005). 
In this field some papers demonstrate that the acreage reduction programs, in particular 
the CRP, have some unintended impacts which may reduce their efficiency (For example see 
Hoang, Babcock, and Foster (1993) and Wu 2000)). They mainly address the slippage effects of 
land retirement. Slippage effects arise for two main reasons: an increase in the use of non-land 
inputs and the diversion of less productive land to crop production. For example, Wu (2000) 
shows that for each one hundred acres of cropland retired under the CRP twenty acres of non-
cropland were converted to cropland in the central United States. In a recent article Roberts and 
Bucholtz (2005) question the reliability of Wu’s empirical findings. However, their work 
provides an evidence for the land conversion (Wu, 2005) 
Previous papers which study economic impacts of the acreage reduction programs 
typically apply partial equilibrium frameworks in their analyses and ignore general equilibrium 
impacts of these programs. The CRP is a large program that can affect the whole economy from 
different directions. The government finances this program from the distortionary income taxes 
($1.8 billion per year). This can adversely affect the economic efficiency through the tax system. 
This program has the potential to affect prices of agricultural inputs and outputs and affect the 
farmers’ behavior. For example, when nitrogen and land are substitute inputs, the CRP can 
encourage farmers to apply more nitrogen (and other inputs). An increase in applied nitrogen 
may adversely affect the water quality which in turn imposes indirect cost on the economy. In 
addition, more demand for non-land inputs (such as fertilizer, capital, and labor) restricts 
resources available in production of other goods and services which in turn reduces welfare. The 
CRP has the potential to raise prices, in particular prices of crop products, which consequently 
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 reduces welfare of consumers. The CRP may also reduce incentives to work and raise 
inefficiency in labor market.  
The CRP has positive and welfare improving impacts as well. It raises prices of crop 
products and therefore reduces the need for the commodity price support subsidies. This can 
generate economic gains through the tax system. Furthermore, since the US is a large exporter of 
crop products, the CRP can raise the prices of these commodities in the world market (Sumner, 
2003). This can generate economic gains for the US economy. In addition to these economic 
benefits, the CRP reduces soil erosion, provides wildlife habitat, and improves water quality. 
This paper investigates long run economic impacts of the CRP program at a macro level 
for the US economy regardless of its environmental consequences. It first examines the 
economy-wide impacts of the program by developing a stylized analytical and numerical general 
equilibrium model. The general equilibrium model is built on the theory of environmental 
regulation in the second best setting setting
2. In particular, the model is an extension of 
Taheripour, Khanna, and Nelson (2006). The model first examines unintended impacts of the 
CRP and their determinants and then measures their magnitudes. Finally, the paper applies an 
econometric analysis to seek empirical evidence for unintended impacts and study impacts of the 
program on the demand for the main agricultural inputs at a macro level. The econometric 
analysis follows Ray (1988) and sheds light on the impacts of the CRP on the economic 
parameters associated with the crop production at an aggregate level. 
Section 2 presents the analytical general equilibrium model and determines factors that 
affect efficiency costs of an incremental increase in retired land. Section 3 describes the 
numerical model and calibration process. Section 4 contains results of the numerical model. 
Section 5 demonstrates the regression analysis followed by the conclusion in Section 6. 
                                                           
2 Throughout this article, the term “second best” refers to a setting with prior distortionary income and commodity 
taxes/subsidies.   
  5 
 The Analytical Model 
Consider an open economy with one representative consumer, two producers, and a regulator. 
Each producer produces only one final good. Hence, there are two final goods: X and Y. Here X 
represents a homogeneous crop product and Y stands for other goods and services. Output of 
these goods and their prices are indicated with OX, OY, , and , respectively. The resources 
used in production of both goods are labor, land, and capital. Endowments of these resources 
are
X p Y p
L ,R , andK , and they are fixed. Land and capital are fully employed. However, the 
consumer consumes some part of the labor endowment as leisure, l. The wage rate, w, is selected 
as the numeraire. Prices of land and capital are  and . The crop producer uses nitrogen 
fertilizer in its production process as well. The economy imports nitrogen fertilizer, , at a 
constant price
R r K r
X N
3 of  N p and exports some part of its crop product, x, at the price of . Domestic 
markets are all competitive and agents are price takers. We assume free trade with no tariffs. The 
demand for exports,
X p
( ) X x p , is downward sloping, with a constant price elasticity of  x ε . The 
balance of trade, Z, can be positive or negative and is defined as follows:  
(1) ( ) XX N X Z pxp pN =+  
The consumer derives utility from consumption of goods, leisure, and foreign reserves. 
The utility function is given by:  
(2) ( , , ) ( ) XY Uu CCl Z ϕ =+ . 
Here CX
 and CY show domestic consumption of X and Y, respectively. In the utility function 
lLL =−is leisure and L is labor supply. We assume that u(.) is increasing in all arguments and 
is quasi-concave and that  () Z ϕ is increasing in Z and weakly concave. The representative 
consumer takes Z as given. We consider reserves as an opportunity to import other goods from 
                                                           
3 We will incorporate the elasticity of supply of nitrogen in the world market in the numerical model.   
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 the world market. Alternatively, we can interpret reserves as a public asset/debt. The consumer 
supplies labor, land, and capital and receives a lump sum transfer, G, from the government. The 
consumer budget constraint is: 
(3) (1 ) XX YY L p Cp C t L Q += − + .  
Where  (1 ) (1 ) RR KK Qt r Rt r K Z =− +− −+ G represents consumer’s non-labor incomes. 
Here , , and are flat tax rates on labor, land, and capital incomes. The following demands 
for goods, supply of labor and indirect utility function, V, can be derived from utility 
maximization:     
L t R t K t
(4)  ,  ( , ,(1 ), ) XX Y L CX p p t Q =−
(5)  ,  ( , ,(1 ), ) YX Y L CY p p t Q =−
(6)  ,  ( , ,(1 ), ) XY L LL pp tQ =−
(7) ( , ,(1 ), ) ( ) XY L Vv pp tQ Z ϕ =− + . 
Production functions represent constant returns to scale (CRS) and are represented by: 
(8)  ,  ( , , , ) XX X X OX L R K N = X
Y  
X
(9)  .  ( , , ) YY Y OY L R K =
Since production functions exhibit CRS, the marginal and average cost functions are 
equal to each other. In addition, because markets are competitive, prices of goods equal marginal 
costs in the absence of price support subsidies. These assumptions imply:  
(10) ( , , ) XX R K N MCM C r r p p == , 
(11) ( , ) YY K R Y MCM C r r p == . 
Here, MCX and MCY represent marginal costs of X and Y, respectively. Competitive markets and 
CRS technologies impose zero profits in both sectors. In equilibrium, the supply of X must equal 
its domestic demand plus exports and the supply of Y must equal its domestic price. That is:  
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 (12) ( ) XX X OCx p =+ , 
(13)  YY OC = . 
Furthermore, market clearing conditions for the primary inputs and nitrogen should be satisfied. 
In this economy, the government has several functions. It supports crop production 




government also taxes incomes and pays a lump-sum transfer, G, to the consumer. The 
ment is committed to a certain level of real lump-sum transfer. Therefore, it adjusts G
with changes in the prices of consumption goods. In equilibrium government revenues mu
equal government expenditures. That is:   
(14)  LL T R o R G tL N SX rR G += ++ ,  
here  LTR R R K K Nt r R t r K =+ and  LTR N stands for non-labor tax revenues. Since the governm
supports production of crop through a subsidy per un
ent 
it of output, the consumer price of each unit 
s:  
XX R K o
of X i
(15)  ) N ( , , p MC r r p = . 
CPF) from the labor tax as:  
S −
To express results succinctly, we define the partial equilibrium marginal costs of public 
funds (M
( / )/( ( / )) LLLL M tL t L tL t = −∂∂ +∂∂   (1 ) MCPF M τ ==+ , where  (16) 
We als
) L L
o define the partial equilibrium marginal excess burden (MEB) of the labor tax as:  
(17)  (/ ) / (
C
LL MEB t L t L τ′ == −∂ ∂ ( / ) t L t +∂∂ . 
superscript C indicates c ted derivative of labor supply with respect to the labor tax. 
labor 
y elasticities. We define elasticity of labor supply with respect to non-labor income 
Here  ompensa
These measures are basically distinguishing between the compensated and uncompensated 
suppl
  8 
 by (/ ) ( / ) LQ dL dQ Q L ε = . Following the literature we assume that 0 LQ ε < . We denote the share 
of lump-sum transfer in total income as: 
(18) /((1 ) ) SG t L Q =− + . 
Fin
GL
ally, we defineλ as the
lfare impacts of an incremental increase in RG we first 
y differentiate the utility function with respect to this variable. Then we define components 




 consumer’s marginal utility of income. 
To examine direct and indirect we
totall
of this equation through different steps. In these steps we use equat
 impacts of the policy from all markets. In this process we apply definitions (16) through 
(18), the Slutsky equation, and Shepard’s lemma to shrink the final result into compact 
components
4. Note that in this derivation, it is assumed that tR and tK are constant. Equation (19) 
shows the final result, where each positive component represents a positive change in the welfare
and vice versa.  
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The first component which is labeled primary retirement effect is equal to the value of 
marginal product of land minus total saving in agricultural subsidies due to the reduction in X.  
                                                           
4 Detailed derivation is available from the author on request.    
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 This is 
e 
ugh the trade channel.  The first subcomponent of the trade effect measures changes in 
the exp
the opportunity cost of retired land regardless of other impacts of the policy on the 
economy. 
The second component which is labeled primary trade effect measures impacts of th
policy thro
ort value of crop product due to an increase in G R . An increase in retired land has the 
potential to restrict supply of crop product. Therefore, when the price elasticity of demand for 
crop product in the world market, , x ε is less than one this term is positive. In this case an incre
in  G
ase 
R decreases export volume of crop product but increases its export value. The second 
subcomponent of the trade effect m sures changes in the utility of reserves due to an increase 
in
ea





. The first term shows 
direction of change in the reserves due to an increase in G R  and the second term represents the 
 the marginal utility of reserves over the marginal utility of income. An increase in retired  ratio of
land may either increase or decrease the reserves. When land and nitrogen fertilizer are 
complement, an increase in RG would reduce the demand for nitrogen which in turn raises the 
reserves, recall that 1 x ε < . However, when these two inputs are substitutable then and in
in R
crease 
s.  G would increase the demand for nitrogen fertilizer which can lead to a reduction in reserve
The econometric results presented below and previous work in this field indicate that at a macro 
level land and nitrogen are substitutable (for example see Hertel, Stiegert, and Vroomen 1996). 






term is equal to one and as the result the second subcomponent of the trade effect will be 
vanished. However, when these marginal values are different then the second component will be 
. When the marginal utility of reserves is equal to the marginal utility of income this 
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<  when there exist a trade surplus. In conclusion, the second subcomponent is posi





Finally, the last subcomponent of the trade effect measures an increase in utility due to diverted 
exports to domestic consumption. In inclusion, when 1 x ε ≤ ,  / dd Z ϕ is large enough, and 
0 G dZ dR > the trade effect offsets some part of the primary retirement costs.  
The third component which is labeled reverse revenue recycling effect is a welfare 
reducing item and measures efficiency costs of additional labor tax that is needed to finance the 
policy. This effect is equal to the marginal cost of public funds minus one times the net change in 
government expenditures due to an increase in RG. In one hand the government raises the labor 
tax rate to pay rental value of re
G
es consumers’ income from these resources and 
discourages labor supply.  
tired acres to their owners. This imposes some efficiency costs to 
the economy. On the other hand the policy raises the non-labor tax revenues, mainly due to an 
increase in the price of land. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the policy reduces the needs for 
agricultural subsidies. These two items eliminate some burdens of labor tax that is needed to 
finance the policy.   
The fourth component which is labeled non-labor income effect reflects the impacts of 
the policy on the labor supply due to changes in the consumer’s non-labor income. The non-labor 
income effect is a negative and welfare reducing item as well. An increase in R  elevates the 
prices of land and capital which accordingly rais
Finally, the fifth component which is labeled land retirement and labor tax interaction 
effect reflecting the efficiency costs due to interaction between changes in the prices of goods 
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 and the labor tax rate. An increase in RG increases prices of both goods which in turns reduces 
the real wage and discourages labor supply. The interaction effect captures the efficiency costs of 
reducti n 
es several 
directions. This section develops a numerical model to measure the overall efficiency 
rtions of acres and gauge their corresponding impacts on the economy.  
 the 
(20)  
on in real wage. This effect has two major subcomponents. The first subcomponent (whe
J=X) is the interaction effect due to changes in the price of crop products. The second 
subcomponent (when J=Y) is the tax interaction effect due to changes in the price of the other 
good.  
The Numerical Model 
The above analytical analysis shows that an incremental increase in retired acres impos
primary and secondary efficiency costs to the economy and it affects economic variables in 
several 
costs of retiring large po
The numerical model follows the analytical model and depicts the US economy at a 
macro level. The representative consumer derives utility from goods and leisure according to
following two-level constant elasticity of substitution utility function: 
() ()
1
U ρ ρ ρ () (1 )
U U




XX X Y CC C ρ αα =+ − .  
In this utility function ( 1)/ UU U ρ σσ =− , ( 1)/ CC C ρ σσ = − ,  u σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between leisure and consumption goods,  C σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two 
ption goods, consum l α and  X α are distribution parameters andϕ indicates marginal utility of the 
reserve.  
We model production processes with two-level production functions introduced by Sato 
d 
e
nd convenient way to build up constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
(1967) and widely used in literature (for example see Binswanger 1974; Kawagoe, Otsuka, an
Hayami 1985; Thirtle 1985; Abler and Shortle 1992).  This typ  of production function provides 
a simple a
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 functio
(21) 
ns with more than two factors of production. In a two-level production function, first, 
production is a function of two composite inputs: which are called mechanical and biological 
inputs. Second, production of each composite input is a function of two inputs. The biological 
input is a function of land and fertilizer and the mechanical input is a function of capital and 
labor. The production functions are written as: 
{}
1
ii ii ρ ρ (1 ) ii





i iB i B i i B i BR N





i iM i M i i M i ML K
ρ ρ ρ γα α =+ − (23)  ,   for  i=X and Y. 
Here Oi,  i B , and i M represent outputs of final goods, composite biological inputs, and 
anical inputs, respectively. In these product ctio e distribution and 
adjustment parameters,
mech ion fun ns α’s and γ’s ar
( 1)/ ii ii ii ρ σσ =− , ( 1)/ Bi Bi Bi ρ σσ = − ,( 1 ) / MiM i M i ρ σσ = − , and  ii σ are 
the elasticities of substitution between the biological and the mechanical inputs, Bi σ are the 
elasticities of substitution between land and nitrogen and Mi σ are the elasticities of substitution 
between labor and capital. It is assumed that production of   does not need nitrogen. This implies 
that 
Y
1 BY α = which in turn implies Y YB Y B R γ = .  
Data 
rk data, so  parameters are taken from the literature. The 
pensated labor supply elasticity of 
Table 1 depicts the US economy in 2002. In this table, the US economy is divided into two 
sectors: a sector which produces crop products and a sector which provides other goods and 
services. In addition to the benchma me
uncom 0.15 L e =  is taken from Goulder et al. (1999). The 
price elasticity of  is assigned to the demand of the clean good based on the work of  1.0
Y p e =
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 Kyer and Maggs (1997). Their work indicates that the price elasticity of aggregate demand f
the US economy was around 1.0 during the time period of 1965-90. This value is adopted 
because the clean good approximately represents an aggregate demand for the US economy. 
Based on the Database for Trade Liberaliz dies (Sullivan et al. 1989), the price elastic
of  0.5
X p e =  is assigned to the domestic demand of the dirty good. This number represents an
inelastic demand for crop products. Furthermore, we assume that the elasticity of demand for 
crop products in the world market is equal to 0.9 x
or 
ation Stu ity 
 
ε = . These elasticities are used to calibra
parameters of the utility function. To incorporate the supply of nitrogen into the model, it is 
assumed that the supply of nitrogen is increasing in its price. To measure sensitivity of results to 
the price elasticity of supply of the nitrogen, the model is solved for three different values of th




(1996). They are shown in table 2. We also do sensitivity analyses to 





SN = 0.5, εSN = 1.0, and εSN = ∞). Finally, elasticities o
substitution in the production functions are ta  Balisteri et al. (2002) and Horan et al. 
check how results change due to changes in the selected parameters.   
To evaluate the efficiency costs an equivalent variation measure ( ) with the following 
extended definition  is calculated for each target of acreage withdrawal:  
(24)  ,  and . 
Here ( , ) e and ( , ) v stand for the expenditure and indirect utility fun
ken from
(2002), and Hertel et al. 
00 01 (,) (,) EV e p u e p u =−
00 (,) uv p m =
11 (,) uv p m =
0 p and 
1 p represent 
n the absence and presence of land retirement, and 
 this 
. This definition 
                                                          
vectors of prices (including prices of inputs) i
0 m and 
1 m  indicate wealth in the absence and presence of land retirement, respectively. In
definition, wealth includes all types of income, leisure, and trade reserves
 
5 This definition is designed based on the question 3.I.12 of Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 
(1995).   
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 captu  an res changes in both the prices d wealth. In this definition, a positive amount of EV 
ents w re los
6
Effic y c
Results for three values of the elasticities of supply of nitrogen fertilizer (ε = 0.5, ε = 1.0, and 
ε  = ∞) have been reported in table 3. Four figures for each of these elasticities have been 
presented in this table: total, average, and marginal costs for each level of acreage reduction and 
the marginal cost of public expenditures (MCPE) associated with that level. The total costs 
gauge reduction in welfare in terms of EV due to the designated level of land retirement. The 
average costs show welfare lost per acre of the retired land and the marginal costs represent 
welfare lost of the last units of the retired land. Finally, the last figures, MCPE, compare the 
marginal costs with the amount paid per acre of the retired land by the government in 2002. The 
MCPE measure the unaccounted social costs of government land retirement payments.  
Table 3 shows that for each level of the retired land, costs are decreasing in the elasticity 
of supply of nitrogen fertilizer. For example, the first acre of the retired land costs the economy 
$83.2, $80.8, and $74.3 when ε = 0.5, ε = 1.0, and ε  = ∞, respectively. In the rest of this 
section we focus on the results for the unit elasticity of nitrogen supply, ε = 1.0, to be neutral 
with respect to this parameter. 
Table 3 illustrates that costs grow with the level of acreage reduction. For example, the 
first and the last retired acres cost the economy $80.8 and $110.1. These figures are 1.5 and 2.1 
times of the money that the government has paid for each acre of retired land in 2002. The 
                                                          
repres elfa s. The numerical model is calibrated and then solved for several 
consecutive targets of acreage reduction (from 3 to 75 million acres) using Mathematica.   
ienc osts 
SN  SN 
SN
SN  SN  SN
SN 
 
6 To evaluate the precision of the calibration process and measure the simulation capability of the 
calibrated model, the status quo is simulated first. The simulation of the status quo shows 
negligible differences (usually less than one percent) between real data and their simulation 
figures. 
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 federal government has paid about $1.7 billion to withdraw 33 million acres of land from 




vernment decides to retire more land (for 
exampl
ucts 
y of supply of nitrogen fertilizer. 
hat when the supply of nitrogen is more inelastic, land retirement generates 
∞) are 
 
 Table 3 reveals that the total social costs of retiring 33 million acres of land is about $2.
billion for the US economy, about $88.8 per acre. The marginal cost of public expenditures for 
this level of land retirement is about $1.8. This means that the last dollar paid by the govern
for the CRP program costs the economy $1.8. This umber reflects the marginal cost of the 
at the current level of acreage reduction. If the go
e to sequester carbon in the soil) costs will grow rapidly. For example, retiring 75 million 
acres of land (twice the current retired land) will cost the economy $7.2 billion, about $96.3 per 
acre. At this level of land retirement the MCPE will be $2.1  
Unintended impacts 
Numerical results reveal that land retirement largely affects the prices of land and crop prod
and it has minor and negligible impacts (but positive) on the prices of capital and other goods. 
Table 4 shows impacts of acreage reduction on the prices of land and the price of the 
homogeneous crop product for the three values of the elasticit
This table illustrates t
stronger price impacts. For example, when the supply of nitrogen is very inelastic (εSN = 0.5), 
retiring 33 million acres of land raises the prices of land and the crop product by 10.6% and 
4.1%, respectively. Corresponding figures for a perfect elastic supply of nitrogen (εSN = 
9.3% and 3.3%, respectively. Furthermore, a careful review of table 4 reveals that the price 
impacts (change in the price of land and crop products) of land retirement grow exponentially 
with the amount of retired acres. 
The price impacts of land retirement have the potential to affect both consumers and 
producers behaviors. In one hand, an increase in the price of land forces crop producers to apply
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 more labor, capital, and nitrogen fertilizer per unit of output. On the other hand, an increase 
the price of crop products encourages consumers to reduce their demand for crop products whi
in turn forces farmers to reduce su
in 
ch 
pply of crop products. In the rest of this section we examine 




ber is very close to the reported figure by Wu, 2000). Table 5 shows that the 
size of   
acts of land retirement on the demand for inputs and supply of crop products. Table 5
illustrates some of these effects for the three values of the elasticities of supply of nitrogen.  
Table 5 illustrates that the aggregate demand for nitrogen fertilizer grows with the 
quantity of retired acreages. As explained earlier land retirement significantly raises the price of 
land compare to the prices of other inputs. This encourages crop producers to apply more 
nitrogen per unit of output. This eventually leads to an increase in the aggregate demand for 
nitrogen fertilizer. For example, table 5 shows that when the supply of nitrogen fertilizer is 
ly elastic (εSN = ∞), retiring 33 million acres of land raises the aggregate demand for 
nitrogen fertilizer by 4.2%. The corresponding figure for an inelastic supply of nitrogen fertilizer 
(εSN = 0.5) is equal to 1.5%. Notice that applied labor and capital per unit of output grow w
level of acreage reduction but their aggregate demand fall slightly due to the reduction in the 
crop production.  
Table 5 illustrates that land retirement has the potential to transfer non-cropland to cr
production. For example, when the supply of nitrogen fertilizer is very elastic, retiring 33 million 
acres of land generates a land slippage effect of 18.9%. This means that at this size of acreage 
reduction, for each 100 acres retired, about 18.9 acres of non-cropland would be converted to 
cropland (this num
slippage effect increases with the amount of retired acres and decreases with the elasticity
of supply of nitrogen fertilizer. However, these factors do not affect the size of the land slippage 
effect very much.  
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 Table 5 also shows that land retirement has a relatively weak impact on the crop 
production. For example, when the supply of nitrogen fertilizer is very elastic, retiring 33 million 
acres of land reduces the supply of crop products by 1.8%. The corresponding figure for a 
perfectly inelastic supply of nitrogen is about 2.3%. This means that land retirement restricts the 
supply  it of 
 
icity of 
 land and nitrogen fertilizer in production of the dirty good is reduced from 
es 
of crop products moderately. This is because of using more non-land inputs per un
output in crop production and because of the existence of the land slippage effect. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To test impacts of alternative parameterizations on the simulation results, three more sets of 
parameters are tested. In the first set, the elasticity of labor supply is reduced from 0.15 to 0.11.
This affects calibrated parameters of the utility function. In the second set, the elast
substitution between
1.25 to 0.75. This affects the calibrated parameters in sector X. In the third set, two more valu
for the elasticity of demand for exports of the crop product, 1 x ε = and 1.1 x ε = , are tested.  
In short, a reduction in the elasticity of labor supply (from 0.15 to 0.11) reduces the 
efficiency costs but not significantly. A reduction in the elasticity of substitution between land 
and nitrogen fertilizer (from 1.25 to 0.75) makes substitution between nitrogen and land difficult
and raises the efficiency costs and generates more slippage e  Fina ults are slightl
 
ffect. lly, res y 
sensitiv w 
odel consistent with the rest of this paper 
roduction at the macro level is a function of four inputs: labor, land, 
e to the elasticity of demand for exports of the crop product. The efficiency costs gro
with higher elasticities of demand for exports.              
Econometric Analysis 
This section applies regression analyses to explore impacts of the CRP on the demand for 
agricultural inputs and investigates structural change in the production parameters in the crop 
industry due to the CRP. To develop an econometric m
it is assumed that crop p
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 capital, and fertilizer (including all chemical inputs). Then it is assumed that the crop indus
minimizes costs of production. Under these assumptions the structure of the production functio
can be studied empirically using a cost function. A useful and flexible functional form that has 
been frequently used in defining cost functions is the translog form. For example, Ray (1982)
estimated a two-output-five-input translog cost function for the US agricultural industry for the
period of 1939-77. The translog cost function of Ray (1982) is modified in the current paper to 
study the US crop industry in the period of 1984-2004. According to Ray (1982), the following 
one-output-four-input translog cost function along with the corresponding input share equations 











Xi i ij i J
ii J
CX X D P P αα γ λ α =+ + + + ∑∑
   
ln ln ii i X i i jJ SD XP αλ γ γ =+ + + ∑   For i =
0
ln ln ln
XX X i i i i
XP P Ph T γγ ++ + ∑∑ ∑
 L, K, R, N and j = L, K, R, N.  
Here C represents the annual cost of crop industry, X stands for annual crop production, D is a 
dummy variable that represents presence of the CRP, Si shows cost share of input i, Pi represents 
price of input i, and T is an annual index of time. The full system (i.e. the cost function and the 
share equations jointly) is estimated under the following restrictions to impose homogeneity of 
j
degree one in input prices:  
1 i α = ∑ , 0 i λ = ∑ ,   0 xi γ
i i i
= ∑ ,  0 ij ij ij γγ γ
ij i j
= == ∑ ∑∑ ∑ .  
ij ji Notice that in this systemγ γ = . Using these restrictions, the full system has been transferred 
. In the modified system the price of labor has been selected as the 
numeraire. The Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated method has been applied to estimate the modified 
translog system.   
to a modified translog system
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 Data 
The following variables have been collected for the period of 1984-2004: C, index of crop 
production expenses; X, index of crop production; PL, index of wage rate paid by farmers; PN, 
fertilizer (including chemicals) price index: PR, index of rental rate of land: PK, price index of 
nputs. The cost share variables are calculated using the crop industry expenses on labor, 
e 
red acres 
radually returned to production during this period. 
For thi
t 
onotonic because it generates positive fitted share at every observation. Finally, the 
si concave in input prices because its Hessian matrix is negative semi definite 
uction 
other i
land, capital, and fertilizer (including all chemicals). The data has been taken from the 
Agricultural Statistics reports (1984 to 2004). 
The dummy variable associated with the CRP has been defined based on the net acreag
reduction during the sample period. The CRP program began enrolling farmland in 1986. 
However, the net retired acres during the period of 1984-96 were negative, because reti
under other acreage reduction programs were g
s reason, the value of the dummy variable is zero in the period of 1984-96 and is one 
thereafter.  
Empirical Results 
A cost function should satisfy homogeneity, monotonicity, and convexity conditions. The 
homogeneity constraints were imposed throughout the estimation process. The estimated cos
function is m
cost function is qua
at every observation. Therefore, the estimated cost function represents a well behaved prod
function. The Durbin-Watson test is preformed for each equation of the full system to test for 
autocorrelation. There was no sign of autocorrelation. The estimated parameters are reported in 
table 6. This table indicates that those parameters which demonstrate structural change in the 
cost and share equations (i.e. K λ ,  R λ ,  N λ , and L λ ) are all statistically significant (at least at 5% 
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 level of significance). The signs of these parameters show that the CRP has had negative impacts
on the demands for capital and land and positive impacts on the demands for nitrogen and labo
It is straightforward to eri  s ifican conomic parameters such as elasticities of 
substitutions between inputs and the price elasticities from the estimated cost function 
parameters. The Allen partial elasticity of substitution is frequently used in the literature to 
 
r.  
 d ve ign t e
determ  the  ine whether pairs of inputs are substitutes or complements. In a translog cost function,
Allen partial elasticities of substitution between inputs i and j, 
A
ij σ , can be obtained from












ij σ > inputs
A σ = ,  
 j and i are net substitutes and when  0
A
ij σ < they are net complements. Note 
that
A A
ij ji σ σ = , this means the Allen elasticity of substitution has symmetry attribute. In a translog 
cost function the own and cross price elasticities of demands for inputs also can be derived from 
owing  the foll formulas, respectively:  


















= .  
ˆ
i S
Here  iJ ε represent the cross price elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of 
input j and  ii ε stands for the own price elasticity of demand for input i. The scale economy is 
another significant economic parameter that can be derived from the estimated cost function 
ete e  param rs. Following Christensen and Green (1976) the scale economy is calculated from th
following formula:  
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 1l n / l n SEC C X =− ∂ ∂ . 
The pairwise Allen elasticities of substitution are computed and reported in table 7 for 
selected years. The table indicates that capital and labor; capital and nitrogen; and land and 









rnment expenditure and causes 
s through the tax system. In addition, it acts as an implicit tax which reduces 
e 
 
te at the beginning of the period but they became compliment at the end of period. Tabl
7 also indicates that land and labor and nitrogen and labor were compliment during the samp
period. In general, elasticities of substitution have changed over the sample period, in particu
after 1996. This confirms a structural change in crop production due to the CRP.   
The computed own price elasticities are reported in table 8 for the selected years. This 
table shows that demand for inputs were relatively inelastic with respect to their own prices 
during the sample period. The own price elasticities of capital and nitrogen were flu
 - 0.5 and -0.69, respectively. The own price elasticity of land has drastically decreased 
absolute terms) from -.17 to -.02 over the sample period. In contrast, the own price elasticity 
labor has significantly increased (in absolute terms) from -0.33 to -0.46 in the same period. T
computed values of the scale economy are also reported in table 8 for the selected years. These 
figures were very close to 1 during the sample period. Finally, the computed cross price 
elasticities are reported in table 9 for the selected years. This sign of these elasticities are 
consistent with the signs of elasticities of substitutions.  
 Conclusion  
The CRP program which extensively and consistently retires cropland can generate signif
direct and indirect economic consequences. It raises gove
efficiency cost
consumers’ real income and generates welfare losses. Since the program has the potential to rais
the prices of crop products in the world market it may generate some gains from the trade
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 channel. At the current level of land retirement the program costs the US economy around $
billion dollars. The cost of program can grow exponentially if the government decided to retire 
more cropland. For example, retiring 75 million acres of cropland may cost the economy u
$7.5 billion. The program has the potential to affect the demand for agricultural inputs, in 
particular demand for nitrogen and generate considerable amount of land conversion. The 
econometric results confirm these effects. 
2.9 
p to 
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Value added at the producer price  87718  8908190  8995908 
Subsidy (the price support)  9513  0  9513 
Value added at the consumer price  78205  8908190  8986395 
Export (payments for fertilizer)  15168  0  15168 
Consumption at the consumer price  63037  8908190  8971228 
Consumption at the producer price  70705  8908190  8978896 
Leisure  0 0 2871434 
Labor income  20894  5139655  5160549 
Land income  27462  9912  37373 
Capital income  24194  3758624  3782818 
Land (million acres)  341  1222  1563 
Homogenized land (million acres)  1148  415  1563 
Capital stock  585325  22827675  23413000 
Homogenized capital   149744  23263256  23413000 
Fertilizer (nitrogen content in million metric tons)  12     12 
Mechanical inputs  45089  8898279  8943367 
Biological inputs  42629  9912  52541 
Marginal income tax rate (percent)        40 
Government expenditures (G)        1595427 
Source: These figures are mainly obtained from the 2002 US input output table, USDA reports, 
and the 2002 statistical abstract of the United States.  
 
Table 2. Selected Parameters  
Description of Parameter  Value  Source 
Uncompensated labor supply elasticity 0.15  Goulder  (1999) 
Uncompensated price elasticity of demand for the dirty 
good 
0.5  Steven et al. 
(2003) 
Uncompensated price elasticity of demand for the clean 
good 
1.0  Kyer and Maggs 
(1997) 
Elasticity of substitution between the biological and the 
mechanical inputs in production of X 
0.5  Horan et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between land and nitrogen 
fertilizer in production of X 
1.25  Hertel et al. (1996) 
and Horan et al. 
(2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in 
production of X 
0.585  Balisteri et al. 
(2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between the biological and the 
mechanical inputs in production of Y 
0.5  Horan et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in 
production of Y 
0.951  Balisteri et al. 
(2002) 
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3 249  83.2  83.2  1.6  242  80.8  80.8  1.5 
6 515  85.8  88.5  1.7  499  83.1  85.4  1.6 
9 783  87.0  89.4  1.7  757  84.2  86.3  1.6 
12 1055  87.9  90.4  1.7  1019  84.9  87.2  1.7 
15 1329  88.6  91.4  1.7  1283  85.5  88.1  1.7 
18 1606  89.2  92.3  1.8  1550  86.1  89.0  1.7 
21 1886  89.8  93.3  1.8  1820  86.7  90.0  1.7 
24 2169  90.4  94.3  1.8  2093  87.2  90.9  1.7 
27 2455  90.9  95.4  1.8  2368  87.7  91.9  1.7 
30 2744  91.5  96.4  1.8  2647  88.2  92.9  1.8 
33 3036  92.0  97.5  1.9  2929  88.8  93.9  1.8 
36 3332  92.6  98.6  1.9  3214  89.3  94.9  1.8 
39 3631  93.1  99.7  1.9  3501  89.8  96.0  1.8 
42 3934  93.7  100.8  1.9  3793  90.3  97.0  1.8 
45 4239  94.2  101.9  1.9  4087  90.8  98.1  1.9 
48 4549  94.8  103.1  2.0  4385  91.3  99.2  1.9 
51 4862  95.3  104.3  2.0  4686  91.9  100.3  1.9 
54 5178  95.9  105.5  2.0  4990  92.4  101.5  1.9 
57 5498  96.5  106.7  2.0  5298  92.9  102.6  1.9 
60 5822  97.0  108.0  2.1  5609  93.5  103.8  2.0 
63 6150  97.6  109.3  2.1  5925  94.0  105.0  2.0 
66 6482  98.2  110.6  2.1  6243  94.6  106.3  2.0 
69 6817  98.8  111.9  2.1  6566  95.2  107.5  2.0 
72 7157  99.4  113.2  2.2  6892  95.7  108.8  2.1 
75 7501  100.0  114.6  2.2  7222  96.3  110.1  2.1 
*The marginal cost of public expenditures on land retirement  
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3 223  74.3  74.3  1.4 
6 453  75.5  76.7  1.5 
9 685  76.1  77.4  1.5 
12 920  76.6  78.2  1.5 
15 1157  77.1  78.9  1.5 
18 1396  77.5  79.7  1.5 
21 1637  78.0  80.5  1.5 
24 1881  78.4  81.3  1.5 
27 2128  78.8  82.1  1.6 
30 2377  79.2  83.0  1.6 
33 2628  79.6  83.8  1.6 
36 2882  80.1  84.7  1.6 
39 3139  80.5  85.6  1.6 
42 3398  80.9  86.4  1.6 
45 3660  81.3  87.4  1.7 
48 3925  81.8  88.3  1.7 
51 4193  82.2  89.2  1.7 
54 4463  82.7  90.2  1.7 
57 4737  83.1  91.1  1.7 
60 5013  83.5  92.1  1.7 
63 5292  84.0  93.1  1.8 
66 5575  84.5  94.2  1.8 
69 5860  84.9  95.2  1.8 
72 6149  85.4  96.3  1.8 
75 6441  85.9  97.3  1.8 
*The marginal cost of public expenditures on land retirement  
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 Table 4. Price impacts of acreage reduction (in percentage change compare to RG=0) 
εSN=0.5 εSN=1.0 εSN=∞ Retired Acreages 












3 0.8  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.8  0.3 
6 1.7  0.7  1.7  0.7  1.6  0.6 
9 2.7  1.1  2.6  1.0  2.5  0.8 
12 3.6  1.4  3.5  1.3  3.3  1.1 
15 4.6  1.8  4.5  1.7  4.2  1.4 
18 5.5  2.2  5.4  2.1  5.1  1.7 
21 6.5  2.6  6.4  2.4  6.0  2.0 
24 7.5  2.9  7.4  2.8  6.9  2.3 
27 8.5  3.3  8.4  3.2  7.9  2.7 
30 9.6  3.7  9.4  3.5  8.8  3.0 
33 10.6  4.1  10.4  3.9  9.8  3.3 
36 11.7  4.5  11.4  4.3  10.8  3.6 
39 12.8  5.0  12.5  4.7  11.8  3.9 
42 13.9  5.4  13.6  5.1  12.8  4.2 
45 15.0  5.8  14.7  5.5  13.8  4.6 
48 16.1  6.2  15.8  5.9  14.8  4.9 
51 17.3  6.6  16.9  6.3  15.9  5.2 
54 18.4  7.1  18.1  6.7  17.0  5.6 
57 19.6  7.5  19.2  7.1  18.1  5.9 
60 20.8  8.0  20.4  7.5  19.2  6.3 
63 22.1  8.4  21.6  7.9  20.3  6.6 
66 23.3  8.9  22.8  8.4  21.4  6.9 
69 24.6  9.3  24.1  8.8  22.6  7.3 
72 25.9  9.8  25.4  9.2  23.8  7.7 
75 27.2  10.3  26.6  9.7  25.0  8.0 
 
  28 
 Table 5. Unintended impacts of acreage reduction (in percentage change compare to RG=0 































3 0.1  18.6  -0.2  0.2 18.3  -0.2  0.3  17.5  -0.2 
6 0.2  19.5  -0.4  0.4 19.1  -0.4  0.7  18.2  -0.4 
9 0.4  19.8  -0.6  0.6 19.4  -0.6  1.0  18.4  -0.5 
12 0.5  19.9  -0.8  0.8 19.6  -0.8  1.4  18.5  -0.7 
15 0.7  20.0  -1.0  1.0 19.7  -1.0  1.8  18.6  -0.8 
18 0.8  20.1  -1.2  1.2 19.7  -1.2  2.2  18.7  -1.0 
21 0.9  20.2  -1.4  1.4 19.8  -1.4  2.6  18.7  -1.2 
24 1.1  20.2  -1.6  1.6 19.8  -1.6  3.0  18.8  -1.3 
27 1.2  20.3  -1.9  1.8 19.9  -1.8  3.4  18.8  -1.5 
30 1.4  20.3  -2.1  2.0 19.9  -2.0  3.8  18.8  -1.7 
33 1.5  20.3  -2.3  2.2 19.9  -2.2  4.2  18.9  -1.8 
36 1.7  20.3  -2.5  2.4 20.0  -2.3  4.6  18.9  -2.0 
39 1.8  20.4  -2.7  2.6 20.0  -2.5  5.0  18.9  -2.2 
42 1.9  20.4  -2.9  2.9 20.0  -2.7  5.5  18.9  -2.3 
45 2.1  20.4  -3.1  3.1 20.0  -2.9  5.9  19.0  -2.5 
48 2.2  20.4  -3.3  3.3 20.1  -3.1  6.3  19.0  -2.7 
51 2.4  20.5  -3.5  3.5 20.1  -3.4  6.7  19.0  -2.8 
54 2.6  20.5  -3.8  3.7 20.1  -3.6  7.2  19.0  -3.0 
57 2.7  20.5  -4.0  4.0 20.1  -3.8  7.6  19.1  -3.2 
60 2.9  20.5  -4.2  4.2 20.2  -4.0  8.1  19.1  -3.3 
63 3.0  20.6  -4.4  4.4 20.2  -4.2  8.5  19.1  -3.5 
66 3.2  20.6  -4.6  4.7 20.2  -4.4  9.0  19.1  -3.7 
69 3.3  20.6  -4.8  4.9 20.2  -4.6  9.4  19.1  -3.9 
72 3.5  20.6  -5.1  5.1 20.2  -4.8  9.9  19.2  -4.0 
75 3.7  20.6  -5.3  5.4 20.3  -5.0  10.4  19.2  -4.2 
 † Converted acres from non-crop to crop production as a percent of retired acres.   
  29 
 Table 6. Estimated coefficients of the translog cost function 
Parameter Value 
Standard 
Error  t Value  P>|z| 
λK -0.0179 0.0061  -2.9500  0.0030 
λR -0.0145 0.0044  -3.3300  0.0010 
λN 0.0146 0.0061  2.3900  0.0170 
λL 0.0178 0.0049  3.6600  0.0000 
αX -0.0109 0.0090  -1.2100  0.2250 
γXX -0.1081 0.0469  -2.3100  0.0210 
αK 0.5544 0.0047  116.8900  0.0000 
αR 0.1554 0.0022  71.8400  0.0000 
αN 0.1595 0.0032  49.2100  0.0000 
αL 0.1308 0.0039  33.7769  0.0000 
γKK -0.0253 0.0552  -0.4600  0.6460 
γRR 0.1105 0.0186  5.9300  0.0000 
γNN 0.0236 0.0394  0.6000  0.5500 
γLL 0.0622 0.0215  2.9000  0.0040 
γKR -0.0722 0.0255  -2.8300  0.0050 
γKN 0.0371 0.0392  0.9500  0.3440 
γRN 0.0119 0.0215  0.5500  0.5820 
γKL 0.0605 0.0252  2.4000  0.0160 
γRL -0.0502 0.0122  -4.1000  0.0000 
γNL -0.0725 0.0168  -4.3200  0.0000 
γXK -0.0334 0.0362  -0.9200  0.3560 
γXR -0.0047 0.0163  -0.2900  0.7720 
γXN 0.0378 0.0241  1.5700  0.1170 
γXL 0.0003 0.0287  0.0100  0.9910 
h 0.0003  0.0001  2.4800  0.0130 
α0 -0.0003 0.0014  -0.2000  0.8400 
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 Table 7. Allen elasticities of substitution between pairs of inputs (selected years) 
Year  σKL σKR σKN σRN σRL σNL
1984 1.983  0.217 1.397 1.422 -1.708  -2.870 
1990 1.812  0.144 1.421 1.493 -1.467  -2.414 
1996 1.834  0.136 1.399 1.433 -1.348  -2.054 
2000 1.684 -0.026  1.418 1.574  -1.431  -1.791 
2004 1.667 -0.055  1.421 1.604  -1.478  -1.787 
 
 
Table 8. Own price elasticities of demand for inputs and scale economies (elected years) 
Own Price Elasticities  Year 
εK εR εN εL
Economies 
of Scale 
1984  -0.49 -0.17 -0.69 -0.33  0.99 
1990  -0.49 -0.12 -0.69 -0.40  1.00 
1996  -0.52 -0.14 -0.69 -0.41  1.01 
2000  -0.50 -0.01 -0.69 -0.45  1.02 
2004 -0.49  0.02  -0.69  -0.46  1.02 
 
Table 9. Cross price elasticities of demand for inputs (selected years) 
Year  εKL εLK εKR εRK εKN εNK εRL εLR εRN εNR εNL εLN
1984 0.22 1.10 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.77 -0.19 -0.28 0.24 0.24  -0.32  -0.48
1990 0.24 1.01 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.79 -0.20 -0.22 0.24 0.23  -0.32  -0.38
1996 0.25 0.98 0.02 0.07 0.24 0.75 -0.18 -0.21 0.25 0.22  -0.28  -0.36
2000 0.27 0.93 0.00  -0.01 0.23 0.78 -0.23 -0.18 0.25 0.20  -0.29  -0.29
2004 0.27 0.92  -0.01  -0.03 0.23 0.79 -0.24 -0.18 0.25 0.20  -0.29  -0.28
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